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Causality is omnipresent in scientists’ verbalisations of their understanding, even
though we have no formal consensual scientific definition for it. In Automata Networks,
it suffices to say that automata “influence” one another to introduce a notion of causality.
One might argue that this merely is an incidental side effect of preferring statements
expressed in natural languages to mathematical formulae. The discussion of this
paper shows that if this is the case, then it is worth considering the effects of those
preferences on the contents of the statements we make and the formulae we derive.
And if it is not the case, then causality must be worth some scientific attention per se.
In any case, the paper illustrates how the innate sense of causality we have may be
made deliberate and formal use of without having to pin down the elusive notion of
causality to anything fixed and formal that wouldn’t do justice to the wide range of ways
it is involved in science-making.
1 Boolean Automata Networks
A network is a set of entities/parameters causing each other to undergo change.
A Boolean Automata Network (BAN) N “ tfi : Bn Ñ B “ t0, 1u | i P V “ J1, nKu
is a set of Boolean functions that define the way automata in the set V “ J1, nK
interact with one another.The interaction graph G “ pV,Aq of N represents these
interactions. Arc pi, jq P A belongs to the interaction graph G of N if and only if xi
appears in the Conjunctive Normal Form of fjpxq – i.e. if and only if fjpxq depends
on xi. When N is in state x “ px1, x2, . . . , xj, . . . , xnq P Bn, automaton j P V has the
possibility of undergoing the change of states xj   xj if it is unstable, meaning: if
j P Upxq “ ti P V : fipxq ‰ xiu. It only actually does undergo the change of states
xj   xj if on top of being unstable in x, j is also updated in x (by us).
As mentioned above, in BANs, it suffices to say that automata “influence” one another
to introduce a notion of causality. It is very natural to interpret arc pi, jq P A as meaning
“automaton i can cause automaton j to change states”. There are other notable
examples of causality’s spontaneous involvement in the BAN formalism. . .
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Additional definitions
Before moving on to the next sections, I will introduce here some additional definitions
that the sequel refers to.
The parallel update schedule
The parallel update schedule of a BAN N “ tfi : Bn Ñ B “ t0, 1u | i P V “ J1, nKu
is defined by the function F : px1, x2, . . . , xnq P Bn ÞÑ pf1pxq, f2pxq, . . . , fnpxqq P Bn.
The transition graph induced by the parallel update schedule is the graph of function
F , namely Tp “ pBn,_§q where px, yq P_§ ðñ y “ F pxq.
In x P Bn, the parallel update schedule exploits all instabilities of Upxq, i.e. it exploits
all possibility of synchronous updates.
The asynchronous setting
Asynchronism is not an update schedule. It is a notion that can mean |Upxq| “ 1.
It however usually is rather taken to refer to a very popular setting of the literature of
(B)ANs. In this setting, the transition graph considered is Ta “ pBn,_q, namely the
asynchronous transition graph where px, yq P_ ðñ Di P Upxq : Dpx, yq “ ti P V :
xi ‰ yiu “ tiu.
In the asynchronous setting, all sequential trajectories are assumed to be possible.
All trajectories involving some synchronous updates are assumed not to be.
General transition graphs
The general transition graph of a BAN is the graph Tg “ pBn,Ñq where the relation Ñ
is given by: px, yq PÑ ðñ @i P V, xi ‰ yi : i P Upxq.
General transition graphs are simply state transition systems. They were introduced in
[4] to to study the behavioural possibilities of networks as opposed to the dynamics.
Block-sequential update schedules
A block-sequential update schedule (BSUS) is an update schedule that updates
automata of a network in a certain deterministic periodic order and with a certain
amount of synchronism in the updates (possibly none). Within a period of updates, all
automata are updated exactly once.
Formally it can be defined as a function ν : AÑ t´1,`1u such that starting in x P Bn at
the beginning of the period, @pi, jq P A, νpi, jq “ ´1 iff i is updated strictly before j is.
Thus, when j is updated, i is already in state fipxq. Otherwise, if νpi, jq “ `1,
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then i is updated no sooner than j is so when j is updated, i is still in state xi.
The “degree of synchronism” of ν might be formally matched to the number of arcs
pi, jq P A such that νpi, jq “ `1. This is only a suggestion however because the
definition of BSUS given here is not common.
Traditionally, BSUSs are rather defined as lists of disjoint blocks of automata pBkqkďK
where
Ţ
kďK Bk “ V . Automata in a block are updated in parallel. The blocks are
updated sequentially [5,6]. With this definition, a BSUS has more synchronism if it has
less and larger blocks. For example consider the BAN of Fig.1. It is what we call a
Boolean Automata Cycle (BAC). One particular BSUS of this BAC is the following which
defines K “ n blocks of size 1: tnu, tn´ 1u, . . . , t3u, t2u, t1u. This BSUS sequentially
updates automata in the reverse order of the cycle. It has no synchronism. Another
BSUS of the BAC is: t6, . . . , n ´ 1, nu, t2, 3, . . . , 5u, t1u which defines K “ 3 blocks.
Two of them are of size greater than 1 so this BSUS does have some synchronism.
It updates at once all automata in block B1 “ t6, . . . , n´1, nu. Then it updates at once
all automata in block B2 “ t2, 3, . . . , 5u. And only then does it update automaton 1.
The BSUS t2, 3, . . . , n ´ 1, nu, t1u has even more synchronism since it updates at
once all automata except automaton 1, before it updates automaton 1.
Notably, all three of these BSUSs are equivalent to ν : A Ñ t´1,`1u defined by
νpi, jq “ 1 ô pi, jq ‰ pn, 1q.
`
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fi : x ÞÑ xi´1 @i ‰ 0
f1 : x ÞÑ  xn
Fig. 1: A negative Boolean Automata Cycle, a.k.a. negative feedback loop. LEFT Its interaction
graph. RIGHT: Its defining local update functions. The BAC owes its negativity to the odd
number of negative arcs in the interaction graph.
2 Synchronism vs Precedence
In some circumstances, a synchronous updating of automata seems to cause local
instabilities to linger in the network longer than they might with more sequentiality.
In other terms, synchronism seems to inhibit the decrease of the number |Upxq| of
automata that are unstable. And as a consequence, it also seems to be responsible
for the global asymptotic instability of the BAN [1, 2–4].
Indeed, on the one hand, the BSUSs of BACs that allow for the most local and global
instability are the BSUSs with a less synchronism [1, 2]. Moreover, we know that with
the parallel update schedule a BAC has many attractors. And the majority of those
attractors involve several local instabilities circulating through the network [7] . On the
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other hand, in the asynchronous setting, all BAC trajectories lead to an attractor that
has either 0 or 1 instabilities [8]. And the general transition graphs of BACs show that at
least some sequentiality is required at some point to reduce the number of instabilities
in the BAC.
All this supports the idea that synchronism is responsible for entertaining instabilities.
In communities focusing on asynchronous Automata Networks to model genetic regula-
tion networks, synchronism is actually notorious for this effect. Synchronism’s alleged
tendency to artificially entertain instabilities in a network is a very common informal ar-
gument invoked to undermine the realism of updating schedules involving synchronism,
and the relevance of research that doesn’t rule synchronism out altogether. As I was
cutting my teeth on such research [2,3,7,9–14] , it was necessary for me to investigate
the causal link between synchronism and instability [15] .
As it turns out, when a small amount of synchronism is added to an otherwise asyn-
chronous BAN, synchronism either has no lasting effect (most frequent case by far), or
it has some (this is the case with the BAN of Fig.2). And if it has some then, precisely,
its effect is to stabilise all local instabilities. And in that, it stabilises the whole BAN [15]
(see Fig.3).
`
` `
`
´
3
0
2
1 `
`
´
´
´
$’’’&’’’%
f0 : x ÞÑ x2 _ px0 ^ x1q
f1 : x ÞÑ x3 _ p x0 ^ x1q
f2 : x ÞÑ  x0 ^ x1
f3 : x ÞÑ x0 ^ x1
Fig. 2: This is the BAN given in [15] as an example of “synchronism-sensitive” BAN. Its
asynchronous transition graph Ta is represented and discussed in Fig.3 together with the
addition of some synchronism to Ta.
So on the one hand, synchronism seems to cause instabilities to linger, on the other
it ‘causes’ instabilities to disappear. The quotes around ’causes’ are to help keep in
mind that the notion of causality we are manipulating here is not one that is formally
defined. In both situations, synchronism is seen as a cause of something, but in none
is it actually the logical implicant of anything. Causality, which is not logical implication,
is much more charged with meaning than logical implication is. Here, it is charged in
particular with the specific meaning of the term “synchronism” that is used in each of
the two situations (cf. paragraph on Block sequential update schedules on Page 3).
The conclusion we can draw from the apparent contradiction is the following.
We have taken a certain perspective. According to this perspective, ’synchronism’ is a
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Fig. 3: The asynchronous transition graph of the BAN of Fig.2 with the additional synchronous
transition 1100 01ÝÑ 0000. All other synchronous transitions of the BAN do not have a lasting
effect: they merely shortcut asynchronous trajectories. With a purely asynchronous updating
of automata states, the BAN has two attractors: (1) the stable state 0000 (Up0000q “ V )
and (2) a large cyclic attractor comprised of the 12 states at the centre. When the transition
1100
01ÝÑ 0000 is added, the BAN looses its second attractor. The thing to notice is the
following. Consider the state x “ 1100. In this state, if the two instabilities – that of automaton
0 P Upxq and that of automaton 1 P Upxq – are not settled – i.e. if the synchronous transition
is not made – then either the two parts of what constitutes a XOR x0‘x1 , namely px0^ x1q
and p x0 ^ x1q start being schlepped around in the network, from one automaton to the
next, thereby entertaining a certain tacit dependency between the instabilities of automata,
precisely the dependencies that characterises the second attractor of the asynchronous
updating. It isn’t yet clear however whether or not they assemble straightforwardly into x0‘x1
at some point. But the BAN of Fig.2 being a minimal example of synchronism-sensitive BAN
[15] , this suggests there is a relation between synchronism-sensitivity and non-monotony.
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meaningful notion: it is a notion that pinpoints actual causes of notable effects we are
interested in. More specifically, according to this perspective, ’synchronism’ is the type
of thing that can cause an effect on local instabilities. With this perspective, we run
into an apparent contradiction. Two opposite effects are incumbent on the same cause.
And that in itself is a call for an update of perspective. Synchronism (and asynchronism
for that matter) might not be the appropriate notion to explain either of the effects we
want it to explain in relation to instabilities.
Nonetheless, the intuitions expressed by the two different cause/effect relations involv-
ing synchronism and instabilities cannot be baseless. Or at least this much is true:
considering that they are baseless is not going to help us make any progress, we
had better trust that they aren’t and go looking for their basis in order to formalise it.
Ruling out synchronism as a possible medium for the effects of entertaining and settling
instabilities means that we need a new candidate cause that can convey a finer form
of causality accounting coherently for both effects. Comparing the two contradictory
situations reveals that precedence might be a more reasonable choice for that. Just
like synchronism, it is involved in both situations. And it is a plausible basis for both
sides of the contradiction as it can explain both situations coherently. Indeed, in the
first situation, instead of “Synchronism causes instabilities to linger” or rather instead
of “In the absence of synchronism, instabilities do not linger (as much)”, it seems more
relevant to use the following explanation of what happens to instabilities:
“Assuming event B owes its possibility to event A not having occurred, then, in case of
precedence of the occurrence of possible event A over the occurrence of possible
event B, the occurrence of A causes the impossibility of the occurrence of B.”
meaning that the implementation of instability A (i.e. the possibility of A) is enough to
settle at once both instability A and instability B. And in the second situation, instead of
“Synchronism settles instabilities”, we can use the following explanation:
“If two events A and B are possible, if the occurrence of each results in the
disappearance of one instability, then in the absence of any interference of
precedence, the occurrence of A and B results in the disappearance of two
instabilities.”
The effects studied in [15] were classified in terms of varying degrees of sensitivity
to synchronism. But following this discussion, sensitivity to precedence of causally
related events might be a more accurate and relevant way of coining the same effects.
Generally, if pi, jq P A and i P Upxq, j R Upxq, then updating i before j – assuming
j owes its stability in x to i being in state xi – causes i to stabilise and j to become
unstable in turn. If both automata i P Upxq, j P Upxq are unstable in x, then – assuming
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xi is the reason for j’s instability in x – updating i before j will stabilise i in state  xi
and thereby also cause the stabilisation of j in state xj “ fjpx¯iq.
It no longer is a matter of synchronism.
On top of putting forward precedence as a more relevant and accurate cause, the
comparison of the two initial contradictory cause/effect relations emphasises all the
other differences there are between the two situations.
Determinism of the parallel update schedule and of BSUSs is one of them. And this
difference with the asynchronous setting relates to the notable fact that asynchro-
nism is not an update schedule, and it is thereby not comparable with sequential
update schedules. Ta, just like Tg, defines a state transition system representing
behavioural possibilities, as opposed to defined dynamical behaviours. It is not clear
how to compare what is called an “attractor” in the asynchronous setting (the terminal
strongly connected components of Ta) to the attractors of dynamics defined by specific
deterministic update schedules.
Periodicity – perhaps even more subtly: the specific kind of redundancy inherent to
periodicity – is another notable difference between the two situations. In the lead of F.
Robert [5], a great many studies have been supporting the general idea that “update
schedules have great influence on the dynamics of BANs” [16–18, 2,3,14,19]. But just
like precedence and determinism, until periodicity’s own effects aren’t studied per
se, there is no rigorous way to form a more reliable intuitive understanding of what
generally causes the entertainment of local instabilities under BSUSs and of what,
other than asynchronism, tends to prevent the entertainment of local instabilities when
synchronism is not exploited.
3 Interlude
The previous section discussed a case where two different effects are intuitively
attributed to the same cause in different contexts, and shows how to learn from that
by letting the following question be raised: How is the cause really involved in the
generation of the effect? and letting it lead to the next question, namely What else is
involved? in particular, what finer cause might the original cause be a facade for or an
abstraction of?
Another case we can learn from is when two different causes are intuitively invoked to
explain the same effect in different contexts. In this case the following question calls
for an answer: What is the effect’s common implicant/generating mechanism? This
case is illustrated in the next section.
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4 Oscillations and the difference between experience of change and
communication of change
In some contexts, negative feedback loops, or negative cycles (cf. Fig.1) are considered
to be directly responsible for the asymptotic oscillations of BANs [20–24]. In different
contexts, BANs can have asymptotic oscillations without negative cycles [16,25, 7,26].
Asymptotic oscillations can therefore not intuitively be attributed to negative cycles
(nor to the specific context of each case for that matter). Negative cycles are not the
fundamental generating mechanism of asymptotic oscillations. A close comparison
between those apparently contradictory cases reveals however, that with or without
negative cycles, asymptotic oscillations are essentially generated the same way:
“something” is disallowing the collapse of an offset between the actual state of a certain
automaton i and the pending influence it sends out to itself possibly via other automata.
In the first context, that “something” is a negative feedback loop. In the other contexts,
it is a combination of a positive feedback loop, some in situ potentiality (defined by
x P Bn), and some synchronism absence of precedence. In those other contexts
the same effect is produced with what can be argued to be less numerous and less
elaborate means, requiring neither precedence nor negation, just the feedback loop
and in situ information.
Now, we have identified a common generating mechanism with two possible imple-
mentations explaining the same effect in two different contexts. It remains to address
the questions that naturally follow starting with What other ways are there to implement
this mechanism? and Can this mechanism be held responsible for other effects?
5 Interlude
The way Sections 2 and 4 suggest to make use of the notion of causality is by
considering it as essentially progressive so that we let causal relations point towards
the signs that already exist of their own coming obsolescence. A particular advantage
of taking such a flexible, yet deliberate and rigorous perspective on causality is that
it keeps us aware of the possibility of having different causes causing the same
effects and thus that the explanations we currently have of the effects we currently
are interested in might still be worth investigating even if they appear to be perfectly
functional and complete explanations. This perspective on causality also prepares
us to deal with new situations in which we observe the same familiar effects in a
system, without having any formal reason to believe that the same implicants we are
used to are responsible. And it favours keeping in mind the possibility that causes we
have represented of the effects we have observed, can themselves be abstractions
of more subtle, atomic mechanisms operating at a lower level of abstraction. It
encourages finding ways to exploit this possibility in order to refine our explanations
and understanding. Generally, this approach to causality emphasises the fact that for a
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significant part, what we manipulate as scientists is representations of the objects that
we study, not just the objects themselves. And in emphasising this fact, it allows us to
take advantage of it.
Now of course, BANs can be studied with purely mathematical interests and perspec-
tives. Then, causality is not such an important concern. Implication is enough. But
because it applies only to specific properties of specific systems in specific conditions,
implication has the downside of being much less portable than causality. Moreover,
in theory, we are free to pick any restriction on the kinds of BANs we consider. And
often, when BANs are studied for purely mathematical reasons, the priority is to pick a
restriction that will help derive new mathematical results . . .
6 Non-monotony and efficiency
A common restriction motivated by biological considerations is the restriction to mono-
tone (B)ANs [8,21,27–29]. Fig.4 shows that a monotone BAN can behave just like a
non-monotone BAN in some conditions (see also [30]). Conversely, Fig.5 shows
that a non-monotone BAN can behave just like a monotone BAN in some conditions.
Studying monotone BANs and non-monotone BANs is therefore not enough. Even
comparing them is not enough because at most what we get from doing that is a
list of monotone BAN properties that non-monotone BANs don’t share, and a list of
non-monotone BAN properties that monotone BANs don’t have. If a monotone BAN
can behave exactly like non-monotone BAN and vice-versa, then what we need to
know, is how non-monotony and monotony work: What are the effects/properties each
of them is strictly responsible for?
` `
1
2 3
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`
´
`
`
´
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#
f1 : x ÞÑ x2 ‘ x3
f4 : x ÞÑ x2 _ x3
#
f1 : x ÞÑ p x2 _ x3q ^ x4
f4 : x ÞÑ x2 _ x3
Fig. 4: LEFT: Non-monotone interactions with automaton 1. RIGHT: Monotone interactions
with automaton 1 that can produce exactly the same effects if the right relative arrangement
in time of automata updates is chosen.
As illustrated in Fig.4, for a monotone BAN’s behaviour to look just like that of a non-
monotone BAN, it requires the right arrangement in time of automata updates, and it
requires us ignoring certain intermediary steps. For the monotone BAN on the right
of Fig.4 to behave like the non-monotone BAN on the left, automaton 4 needs to be
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updated systematically before automaton 1 is, and the two sequential transitions x “
px1, x2, x3, x4q 4ÝÑ x1 “ px1, x2, x3, f4pxqq 1ÝÑ x2 “ pf1px1q, x2, x3, f4pxqq need to be
summed up into just one transition x “ px1, x2, x3, x4q ÝÑ x2 “ pf1px1q, x2, x3, f4pxqq.
Incidentally, since automaton 4 no longer has any impact, we can loose it altogether
and concentrate on the asynchronous transition px1, x2, x3q ÝÑ pf1px1q, x2, x3q. In any
case, the example of Fig.4 shows that the intrinsic effects of non-monotony that cannot
be reproduced without non-monotone fi’s, i.e. effects that represent the real difference
between the two types of BANs, are strongly related to time flow (the relative order
of events considered) and to the degree of precision of our observations of global
trajectories (with more or less intermediaries). This suggests that non-monotony per
se might impact in terms of the efficiency of the execution of mechanisms in BANs.
`´
`
j
i
k
`
j
k
i
#
fi : x ÞÑ xj ‘ xj “ 0
fk : x ÞÑ xj
#
fi : x ÞÑ xj ‘ xk
fk : x ÞÑ xj
Fig. 5: LEFT and RIGHT, the function defining how automaton i behaves is fipxq “ xj ‘ x` for
` P tj, ku. Whether or not j is considered to be an influencer of i depends on whether ` “ j
or ` ‰ k. And yet, the non-monotone BAN on the right can be made to behave exactly as the
monotone BAN on the left by imposing the systematic precedence of the update of k over
that of i so that @x, fipxq “ xj ‘ fkpxq “ xj ‘ xj .
Of course, such a claim needs to find some formal support. Even though the notion of
causality it conveys is unlikely to be exhausted in one proven mathematical statement,
the claim might nonetheless be supported to some extent by putting forward proven
mathematical statements that are compatible with it just like the example of Fig.4 is.
But Fig.5 suggests that just like with synchronism, at some point, we might need to call
into question non-monotony’s capacity at explaining relevantly the effects we attribute
the responsibility of to it. And together with that, we’ll have to call into question the
perspective that places the focus on the distinction monotony/non-monotony rather
than on a more subtle distinction, one that can provide more complete explanations
with less means. In other terms, non-monotony will eventually have to give way to a
finer explanation of the same effects. And considering Fig.5, it seems that two notions
implied by non-monotony might then be put forward instead of non-monotony: a notion
of “witness” and a notion of “inconsistent parallel transfer of the same information”.
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7 Non-expansivity
In some (asynchronous) contexts [20,31], a BAN N is defined using the global update
function F : x ÞÑ pf1pxq, . . . , fnpxqq “ N which happens to coincide with the func-
tion defining the dynamics of N under a parallel update schedule. The definition is
equivalent to the one chosen in Section 1, namely N “ tf1, . . . , fnu. But it makes
it more natural to pick restrictions on BANs that are given by properties of F . An
example is non-expansivity: @x, y P Bn : |txi ‰ yiu| ě |tF pxqi ‰ F pyqiu|. Intuitively,
F ’s non-expansivity corresponds to the BAN having a form of global instantaneous
potential. Assuming F ’s non-expansivity happens to favour the derivation of some
results about asynchronous BANs [32, 33]. But precisely, asynchronous BANs are BANs
whose dynamical constraints forbid them the use of this global potential. This makes it
difficult to grasp intuitively the meaning of the results in question. And mathematical
results that are more difficult to have an intuitive grasp on are often results that are
more difficult to generalise and relate to other results.
8 Assumptions and intuitions
The examples of sections 6 and 7 show that however mathematically sound are
the mathematical results we prove thanks to mathematical assumptions/restrictions,
disregard for intuitive causality at worst stakes the applicability of those results, and
generally limits our progression. In particular, without deliberate care, there is no
reason to believe that we owe the deriving of these results to some deeper opportune
relevance of the mathematical assumptions/restrictions. There is no reason to believe
there is anything in the assumptions/restrictions that could enable the generalisation of
the results beyond the setting they define, nor anything that could at least guarantee
the relatability of the results to other existing results. The primary reason why we
might have managed to derive anything under a particular assumption/restriction might
be that it is an extremely strong assumption/restriction. It might be like studying
crows by concentrating on the class of crows that a human being has reported seeing
picking up a piece of pink plastic wrapper. It might be quite unclear what it is that
we are studying and learning about exactly: the original (mathematical) object of
interest? the restriction? And in the case of Automata Networks, this means that
the only hope to actually build a global understanding of networks lies in the platonic
wager that it will necessarily “emerge” from the accumulation of independent studies
made of particular models of networks in different settings, sometimes juxtaposed for
comparison. In lines with Section 2, let us mention as an example that a great amount of
rigorous theoretical attention has been invested in the study of a large variety of update
schedules [5,6,16–18,34–39, 2,3,14,19]. And yet, none of the studies it occasioned, not even
the ones that compare specific update schedules, have yet provided explicit answers
to the kind of fundamental questions mentioned in Section 3, including questions about
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the effect per se of the redundancy inherent to the periodicity of a periodic update
schedule, the effect per se of the determinism of a deterministic update schedule, the
effect per se of varying amounts of instabilities, and of varying degrees of imposed
precedence between their exploitation. This can however naturally be made up for
by sometimes (a) focusing primarily on general – i.e. fundamental and portable –
network attributes (e.g. synchronism, non-monotony, reversibility, subsequence) rather
than on network-specific properties (e.g. particular interaction digraphs, particular fi’s)
or restrictions, and by (b) studying rigorously the involvement of those attributes in
the behavioural possibilities of networks (as opposed to describing formally a specific
dynamics). This way, what we know of networks and what we don’t can be re-examined
and clarified.
9 Time flow and potential storage/computation space
The systems we consider as scientists are often assumed to be conditional to properties
of time (flow). Despite this, their formal definitions sometimes allows properties of time
flow to mingle or overlap with their own properties (cf. remark made in [30], Section 2,
about update constraints and the dynamical systems view on BANs). Thus, time flow
contributes to the way we attribute properties to a system. Yet, it isn’t always clearly
distinguished from causality.
Generally, when it isn’t regarded as a pre-existing constraint on the systems we
consider, time flow – or rather just “Time” – is seen as a “resource”, suggesting that we
have a tacit obligation to use it sparingly, and, without fail, in finite quantity. Whatever
we call it, we tend to assume that it pre-exists both the systems we study and the
attention we invest in them, and that it frames both the systems’ behavioural possibilities
and the leeway we take on them. Operational Research works its satisfaction and
optimisation problems around it; Bio-informatics builds models out of what it knows
of it or despite what it doesn’t [40–44]; and even for Concurrency, time flow is mostly
something in which distributed pieces of computation might be reunited [45,46]. Despite
its very dense presence in the scientific landscape, time flow is seldom a primary
object of our attention. This results in plenty space for spontaneous interpretations
to operate. And in particular it gives carte blanche to a natural tendency we have to
expediently distinguish, confuse, overlook or classify issues and properties related to
time flow such as simultaneity, synchronicity, precedence, subsequence, difference,
determinism, periodicity, causality, time scale, change, process of change, realism,
duration. As a result, we miss out on (a) the vicariance of some of these properties for
which time flow might actually not be the exclusive medium, and (b) possible leeway
through this vicariance.
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In an isolated network, time flow is precisely determined by the set of all possible
events considered in the network and by their relative order1.
Giving to causality the attention advocated for in the previous sections leads to putting
emphasis on the notion of time flow. It requires to systematically isolate the involvement
time flow has in the effects we take interest in, and decompose it into more atomic
properties that can more tightly be held responsible for the effects. Thus, the effects of
specific properties of time flow (possibly implicitly assumed by the specific framework,
e.g. precedence of certain event occurrences over certain others) may be compared
with effects of properties specific to networks (properties of the fis). And thus, we can
work towards a better understanding of network sensitivity to time flow. We can start
clarifying the kind of information time flow is a vehicle of, as well as the part of the
information encoded in the clockworks of networks (the fi’s) that can equivalently be
encoded into time flow.
Eventually we may also clarify the kind of computation complexity time flow can manage.
Indeed, results [15] suggest that under very specific conditions, attributes of time flow
might participate in the overall network computation in ways that are comparable to
logical gates.
As argued in [30], the notion of synchronism in BANs is often confused with a no-
tion of simultaneity in ’reality’ referring to dates represented by the same point on
The Time-Line [30] . Nonetheless, in BANs, the possibility of synchronism is an atempo-
ral relation between possible events. It relates events of the set txi   xi | i P Upxqu.
Events that are synchronously possible are independently caused: they can’t be the
cause of one another since they haven’t yet occurred. So synchronism implies nothing
about time flow. Precisely, the occurrences of the events it relates are not ordered
relatively to one another – or at least, in the case of asynchronous BANs, not yet in x.
If BANs are supposed to model what we observe of real systems, then the implica-
tions of this are noteworthy. How the occurrences of synchronously possible events
actually end up arranging themselves relatively to one another is information. And it
is information that is not modelled. We can either claim that we have the information
(cf. assumptions mentioned on page 9 of [30]), or we can look for it. If we claim we have
the information, then as [30] demonstrates, we still cannot model it with BANs: we can
only interpret a feature of BANs as representing it which is very different. To explain a
particular ordering of occurrences of synchronously possible events requires certain
care in how the notion of causality is handled. The model (i.e. the BAN) accounts
for the synchronous possibility of the events, and not the relative arrangement of their
occurrences. If the model represents what we know of the real system at a certain
1Note how different this is from saying that in a network, all possible events considered happen in
Time and their order is defined by Time or relatively to it. In particular, it informally implies a different
sense of the term “isolated”.
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level of abstraction, then the information we are looking for – about the relative ordering
of synchronously possible events – cannot be found at the same level of abstraction,
or else, we did a bad job in modelling the real system and/or in choosing a formalism
to do that. Building a model with the capacity of revealing causal relationships that
are otherwise not apparent to us, is not the same thing as building a representation
of the set of effects we are interested in. The relative ordering of the occurrences
of synchronously possible events creates new relationships between those events –
relationships that otherwise don’t exist as evidenced by the synchronous possibility
of these events. Thus, it brings together otherwise presently independent pieces of
information and can cause them to interact as they wouldn’t have if they had been left
independent. In the case of the BAN of Fig.2, the effect of adding this relation evokes
that of logical connectors (^,_,‘, cf. caption of Fig.3). Of course, again, this claim
begs to be investigated.
10 Conclusion
There is not much reason to believe that there is a scientific definition of the notion
of causality that can be found to account completely for the way causality serves
science-making. Centuries of modern science-making haven’t been enough to find
anything close to a satisfying proposition. The notion is much too large and diverse
to be fitted exhaustively into a fixed predefined formalisation of it. Besides, causality
stands for humans’ instinctive way of grasping the world. It is an essential part of our
motivation to explore the world further and have more of it grasped. It makes sense
to have it serve science-making in an unformalised intuitive way. This is however not
a reason for letting it serve science-making in a fortuitous way. And we have shown
that rather than sidelining the manifestations of this intuitive instinct of ours, we can
advantageously supervise its interference with the scientific formalism we use, and let
it serve as a pointer towards knowledge in need of further explicit formalisation.
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